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Alternative Dispute Resolution of Employment
Discrimination Claims
R. Gaull Silberman"
Susan E. Murphy*
Susan P. Adams"

I. INTRODUCTION
Section 118' of the Civil Rights Act of 19912 states:
Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of
alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and
arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts or
provisions of Federal law amended by this title.
Thus, in the same law that created a massive incentive for litigation by
authorizing.compensatory and punitive damages and jury trials for victims of
employment discrimination,3 Congress explicitly endorsed a wide range of
alternatives to litigation.
That a major civil rights statute should encourage the use of alternatives to
litigation indicates a significant shift in congressional and public attitudes about
the adequacy and effectiveness of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR").4
Originally rejected by civil rights activists as second-class justice for victims of
discrimination and by employers as meaningless and lacking in finality, ADR has
generated a great deal of positive interest in recent years. Faced with the evermounting costs and delays of litigation and mindful of the development of better
ADR methods with improved procedural safeguards, both employers and
employees are looking to the benefits of speedier, less costly, and less confronta-
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* Ms. Silberman is Vice Chairman of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

Ms. Murphy and Ms. Adams are Special Assistants to the Vice Chairman.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official
Commission policy.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (Supp. IV 1992). The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
contains the same provision. See 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (Supp. IV 1992).
2. Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42

U.S.C.).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 a (Supp. IV 1992).
4. "Alternative dispute resolution" generally means, in the employment context, "a method
of resolving personnel and workplace disputes without traditional litigation and with the help of a
trained neutral or a panel of neutrals.... [Ilts objective is to resolve disputes efficiently and
satisfactorily before the litigation process is initiated so that the employee will not feel compelled to
seek resolution through external means." Douglas S. McDowell, Alternative Dispute Resolution
Techniques 7-8 (1993).
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tional ADR mechanisms. Federal agencies, including the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, are also using ADR to a greater degree as a result of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and another recent congressional mandate, the 1990
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act.'
This essay begins with a brief history of the use of ADR in resolving
employment discrimination disputes and then describes various ADR options,
with their advantages and disadvantages. The next section looks at legal
developments-particularly in the Supreme Court and Congress-relating to
arbitration. The essay then addresses the interplay between an employer's ADR
system and the EEOC's processes and, finally, describes the EEOC's use of
ADR, including its pilot mediation project.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYMENT ADR

The use of private mechanisms to resolve employment disputes had its
origins in labor law. After World War I, collective bargaining agreements
"introduced the notion of fair and impartial arbitration of differences" by an
objective outsider.6 Grievance and arbitration procedures became the norm for
industrial disputes, gaining support through judicial and legislative measures. 7
Until recent years, however, this form of ADR was largely limited to the
unionized sector.
In 1964, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act' created the EEOC and federal
employment discrimination law, using the National Labor Relations Board and
federal labor law as its basic model. But, in a compromise reflecting the fear of
a strong federal antidiscrimination machinery, Congress refused to confer either
the NLRB's cease-and-desist powers9 or independent litigation authority on the
EEOC. Instead, it required the fledgling agency to attempt to conciliate all
investigated charges on which the agency found cause.' 0 Thus, at a time when
private, informal dispute resolution systems were generally confined to the
collective bargaining context (and indeed the term "ADR" had not yet been
coined), the EEOC's administrative process was to utilize under public auspices
a form of ADR for the speedy and mutually satisfactory resolution of complaints.

5. 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-583 (Supp. IV 1992).
6. David W. Ewing, Justice on the Job 104 (1989).
7. Linda Singer, Settling Disputes 6 (1990). See also Stephen A. Plass, Arbitrating, Waiving
and Deferring Title VII Clains, 58 Brook. L. Rev. 779, 784-85 (1992) (labor arbitration has been a
"reliable and effective vehicle for resolving industrial disputes" and has gained "unprecedented
judicial recognition, support and deference").
8. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1988) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988 and Supp. IV 1992).
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1988).
10. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 358-59, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 2450-51
(1977). See also Alexander v.Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44. 94 S.Ct, 1011, 1017 (1974).
Private parties could bring suittnder Title VII, and the EEOC could enter only as amicus curiae.
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Unfortunately, the administrative process proved to be neither speedy nor
mutually satisfactory. And the Commission's efforts at conciliation and early nofault settlements came to be looked upon with disfavor from all sides, particularly plaintiffs and their lawyers who were concerned that these approaches did
nothing to redress the patterns and practices of discrimination proscribed by the
1964 Civil Rights Act.
In 1972, Congress amended Title VII, again rejecting the cease-and-desist
model but finally giving the EEOC prosecutorial power." Thereafter, whenever
conciliation failed, the Commission could sue in federal court to enforce Title
VII. 2 Employees and the newly empowered EEOC increasingly turned to the
courts as Congress expanded employees' rights (and EEOC's responsibilities).
In 1967, Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"). 3 In 1990, Congress prohibited discrimination on the basis of
disability in the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 4 which incorporates
Title VII's procedures. And the 1991 Civil Rights Act amended Title VII and
the ADA to authorize jury trials as well as compensatory and punitive damag5
es.'
This dramatic expansion of statutory rights and remedies 6 has exacerbated
and will undoubtedly continue to exacerbate the trend to make workplace
disputes into federal cases (and state as well), thus fueling the litigation explosion
that has generated new interest in the use of ADR. 7 But other factors also
have contributed to the growing interest in ADR.
In the early years of civil rights law enforcement, plaintiffs generally
eschewed the use of ADR because such methods were perceived to be "an
inferior system of justice,"'" inadequate to effectuate the broad remedial goals
of Title VII. 19 Early judicial decisions were inhospitable to ADR, at least in

II. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. § 4(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1988).
Private parties retained their right to sue under the statute. Id.
12. Conciliation and informal methods of settlement continued to be the preferred means of
enforcement, however. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988). See discussion infra at 1554-57 of
EEOC's struggle to balance its law enforcement function with its caseload management needs.
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. IV 1992).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. IV 1992).
16. At the same time, state courts and legislatures also have given employees broader rights
to sue for wrongful discharge, breach of contract, and discrimination.
17. See generally Evan J.Spelfogel, Legal and Practical Inplications of ADR and Arbitration
in Employment Disputes, 11 Hofstra Lab. L.J. 247, 248 (1993) ("Employment litigation has grown
at a rate many times greater than litigation in general. Twenty times more employment discrimination cases were filed in 1990 than in 1970, almost one thousand percent greater than the increase in
all other types of civil litigation combined." (citations omitted)).
18. See Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 751 n.12 (8th Cir. 1986)
(describing commercial arbitration).
19. Enforcement of the civil rights laws through litigation and agency action ftrthers the
statutes' purposes in a number of ways. For example, large and well-publicized back-pay awards
have a significant deterrent effect. As the Supreme Court said in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody.
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the form of arbitration. 20 Even now, some plaintiffs' advocates and some
commentators continue to criticize ADR methods, particularly arbitration, as
procedurally deficient and skewed toward employers. 2' But as ADR procedures
have improved and litigation grown more time-consuming and costly, doubts
about whether ADR should play any role in civil rights enforcement have
significantly diminished. With courts and Congress now encouraging ADR,
including arbitration,22 the debate has shifted to the proper balance between the
23
role of ADR and the role of enforcement agencies and the courts.
Employers increasingly are adopting internal ADR methods, 24 in part
because of expanding statutory rights and remedies but also because of a growing
trend to give employees greater participation in management and give human
resource departments a more influential voice.25 ADR is seen as one aspect of
good management of human resources. In addition, mobility and diversity have
increased in the workforce, and "so have conflicts in expectations and values
among well-meaning employees," thus adding to the need for good internal
26
dispute-resolution procedures.
Employees are better educated, more litigious, and more willing to challenge
authority, and want a sense of participation with management and a fair hearing

422 U.S. 405, 417-18, 95 S. Ct. 2362, 2371-72 (1975). "it is the reasonably certain prospect of a
backpay award that 'providels] the spur or catalyst which causes employers and unions to selfexamine and to self-evaluate their employment practices ....-. (citation omitted). Moreover, the
investigation of individual complaints can lead to the discovery of patterns and practices of unlawful
discrimination, which can best be challenged through systemic or class litigation. And precedentsetting judicial decisions, whether in individual or class cases, cause more widespread changes as
employers conform their practices to the law voluntarily.
20. See infra section IV.
21. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L. 1073, 1076-78, 1085 (1984)
(questioning the justice of settlements through ADR, which may be distorted by inequalities in the
parties' resources and bargaining power, and may undermine the duty of judges ;"to explicate and
give force to the values embodied in ... the Constitution and statutes"); James L. Guill & Edward
A. Slavin, Jr., Rush to Unfaintess: The Downside oJ'ADR, Judges J.. Summer 1989, at 8; cf. Harry
T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Pana~cea or Anathema?, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 668, 679-81
(1986) (expressing concern that ADR not become "a tool for diminishing the judicial development
of legal rights for the disadvantaged" and that inexpensive, expeditious, and informal adjudication
"is not always synonymous with fair and just adjudication").
22. See infra section IV.
23. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 21. at 680 (suggesting that ADR methods can be
appropriately applied to those employment discrimination cases that are "highly fact-bound" and
capable of being "resolved by applying established principles of law").
24. Ewing, supra note 6, at 3 (the number of nonunion employers having mechanisms for
ensuring "employee justice" is "growing by leaps and bounds"). One authority estimates that more
than one-third of all nonunionized employees in the United States now have at least one company-run
dispute resolution procedure available to them for dealing with any type of complaint; others have
procedures limited to certain types of complaints such as discrimination. Singer, supra note 7, at
100-01.
25. Ewing, supra note 6. at 23.
26. Id. at 19.
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for their grievances. 27 But outlets for their complaints, other than the courts,
have been limited. Often EEOC and state fair employment agencies afford the
only readily available, relatively cost-free opportunity for independent, third-party
investigation and conciliation of an employee's complaint short of litigation.
Though all kinds of employment disputes are brought to them, the jurisdiction
of these agencies is limited to claims of discrimination. And even when a
complaint is cognizable under the antidiscrimination laws, burgeoning case loads
at the EEOC and other agencies can cause long delays. Employees may,
therefore, prefer alternatives that are less formal, expensive, and adversarial, and
more flexible, private, and expeditious.
III. ADR METHODS AND CHOICES
The term "ADR" encompasses a wide range of problem-solving techniques
intended to resolve disputes without resort to litigation. ADR can be classified
into three types:28 (1) mediation, in which a neutral third party helps the parties
reach a mutually acceptable agreement in a confidential proceeding but does not
impose a solution; 29 (2) arbitration, in which a neutral third party hears
arguments, reviews evidence, and then issues a final and binding decision;-' and
(3) hybrid procedures, in which, for example, a mediator makes a recommendation to settle, an outside expert renders a nonbinding evaluation of the claim, or
the claim goes to a binding decision if mediation does not resolve the dispute
(mediation-arbitration). Arbitrators and mediators usually are outside, professional neutrals, but an ADR system also may employ in-house personnel as
investigators or members of a "peer review" board.
While often used to avoid costly and time-consuming litigation, ADR
processes have other important advantages for employees and employers. ADR
contributes to employee morale by enabling managers and employees to develop
mutual trust and respect, 3' byallowing employees to take an active role in
settling disputes while preserving ongoing relationships,32 and by giving
employees a forum for their complaints before either side becomes too
antagonistic or entrenched in a particular position. 33 An effective ADR program

27. Id. at 17-23.
28. See Singer, supra note 7, at 20-29.
29. For an example of mediation, see discussion of the EEOC's pilot project infra at 1554-57.
30. Arbitration is "a private adjudicatory process invoked as an alternative to tiling a lawsuit."
Richard E. Speidel, Arbitration of Statiutoi Rights Under the Federal ArbitrationAct: The Casefor
Reform, 4 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 157, 158-59 (1989).
31. Ewing, supra note 6, at 6-7.
32. Singer, supra note 7, at II.
33. McDowell, supra note 4, at 20. The availability of an informal means of redress is valuable
to both employer and employee in light of the alternatives. If the employee remains quiet and does
nothing about the problem, he or she becomes disgruntled and less productive, and a possibly
discriminatory or unfair situation goes uncorrected or worsens; if the employee quits, the employer
may lose a productive worker; and if the employee seeks redress from external sources such as the
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can ensure greater compliance with personnel policies by holding supervisors
accountable to an internal review process, and by providing an incentive to deal
with complaints at an earlier stage. 4 The process gives management better
feedback on how its policies and practices affect employees.3"
The wide range of ADR methods enables a company to tailor a program to
fit its particular needs. Employers have created ongoing, structured internal
dispute resolution procedures, making one or more ADR techniques available to
all employees or a subgroup such as nonunionized, nonmanagement employees. 36 In some companies, employees have the right to complain about any
aspect of their employment; in others, the system is limited to such matters as
discharge and discipline, or has special procedures for certain types of complaints
such as harassment. The focus may be on unfair treatment and violations of
company policy, or may include statutory discrimination claims. At many more
companies, ADR is used on an ad hoc basis to deal with complaints as they arise
or lawsuits after they have been filed. In designing an ADR system, employers
should look to their own corporate goals and culture and consider the advantages
and disadvantages, as well as the legal parameters, of each option.
Mediation raises few legal concerns because participation is voluntary at
37
every stage of the process and any resolution must be by mutual agreement.
Mediation is considered particularly well-suited where confidentiality may be
important to the complaining party, as in sexual harassment cases, or in situations
where preserving the ongoing employment relationship is important. 38 Because
mediation offers maximum flexibility and focuses on problem-solving, it can lead
to innovative solutions that benefit both sides. But mediation lacks finality and
therefore may only add another layer to the process without heading off
arbitration by an
litigation. 39 Thus, one variation is for a company to require
40
unsuccessful.
is
mediation
if
step
final
a
as
outside neutral
In a peer review system, a board, typically consisting of three of the
complaining employee's "peers" and two members of management, renders final

courts or EEOC, resolution of the problem is delayed and made more costly. I at 21.
34. Ewing, supra note 6, at 8-9.
35. Id. at 6-9.
36. See generally Ewing, siq1 ra note 6 (case studies of 15 companies); Alan F. Westin & Alfred
G. Feliu, Resolving Employment Disputes Without Litigation (1988) (profiles of ADR programs of
12 organizations).
37. See Westin & Feliu, supra note 36. at 291-304 (Center for Public Resources. Inc., Model
Procedure for Mediation of Termination and Other Employment Disputes).
38. See Singer. supra note 7,at 161.
39. Id. at 105 (While most employees opt first for private, nonconfrontational avenues, "[some
employees prefer procedures that adjudicate who was right and who was wrong over those that
attempt to smooth over differences, particularly in what they consider serious cases of infringement
of their rights.").
40. Ewing, supra note 6, at 86 (noting that the presence of outside arbitration as a final stage
adds credibility to the process and puts pressure on the internal tribunal to render sound decisions,
but many employers are reluctant to cede authority to arbitrators, and arbitration adds more time to
the process).
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or advisory decisions. 4 The availability of such a system generates a high
degree of satisfaction among employees, whether or not they actually use it,
because it is perceived as fair and not intimidating, and promotes employee
participation in management.4" The process is particularly quick and inexpensive. Peer review boards are especially competent to decide whether company
policy has been consistently applied, as co-workers often are the best judge of
whether standards such as absenteeism or productivity have been met. But
because they are untrained in statutory rights, they are less qualified to decide
issues of discrimination, and some employers exclude such claims from this type
of process.43 Though peer review board decisions on employment discrimination complaints cannot be legally preclusive because of the presence of
management representatives on the board, employers have found such decisions
are often final as a practical matter because employees who lose before a panel
of their peers are more willing to accept the decision.
Arbitrationhas many of the advantages of litigation at a much lower cost."
The proceeding is before a fair and impartial professional arbitrator, mutually
chosen by the parties, who has expertise in the law and fact-finding procedures.45 Arbitrators can be given authority to provide the full panoply of legal
remedies available in court. Employees benefit from access to a more efficient,
expeditious, and inexpensive form of justice; employers save litigation costs and
avoid the disruptive effects on management of protracted legal proceedings open
to the public. Reinstatement may be a more realistic remedy for the employee
after a swift arbitral proceeding, and back pay liability will not continue to
mount.

But the advantages of arbitration may be its disadvantages too. Because it
is a trial-like process, arbitration may exacerbate the adversarial aspects of the
parties' relationship. Attorneys usually are involved. The more procedural
safeguards that are added, such as discovery rights, the more costly the
proceeding becomes. The generally private nature of arbitral proceedings and the

41. Id. at 85 (noting that if decisions are advisory in a peer review system, management retains
more control, but the system has less credibility with employees).
42. Id. at 4 (Employees who use such aprocedure "leave with the feeling that, win or lose, they
had their day in court": other employees benefit as well because they -know that an effective
grievance procedure is available to be used ifnecessarY.").
43. McDowell, supra note 4, at 54. See also Ewing, supra note 6, at 97 (A shortcoming of
some peer review systems is that grievants cannot attack the validity of company policies.).
44. For a general discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration from the
employer's perspective, see Stuart H. Bompey & Michael P. Pappas. Is There a Better Way?
CompulsorY Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Clamns a ter Gilmer. 19 Employee Rel. L.J.
197, 210-12 (1993): James A. King, Jr. et al., Agreeing to Disagree on EEO Disputes, 9 Lab. Lawyer
97, 101-03 (1993); Thomas J. Piskorski & David B. Ross, Private Arbitration as the Exchlsive Means
of Resolving Employment-Related Disputes. 19 Employee Rel. L.J. 205. 209-10 (1993); McDowell,
supra note 4, at 29-39.
45. See Westin & Feliu,. supra note 36. at 304-19 (Center for Public Resources. Inc., Model
Procedure for Employment Termination Dispute Adjudication).
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lack of publicized decisions have made plaintiffs skeptical of the appropriateness
of arbitration for public law claims such as discrimination. Moreover, arbitration
is limited to resolving the particular dispute at hand, which contributes to the
efficiency of the process but adds to the concerns about whether claims of
discrimination can be adequately remedied. 46 Although some employers favor
arbitration because of its finality, others are reluctant to give an outsider final
authority to resolve disputes.47 And, as discussed in the next section, arbitration
raises the greatest number of legal concerns precisely because of its assertedly
mandatory, binding nature.
IV.

ARBITRATION FROM GARDNER-DENVER TO GILMER

The inclusion of arbitration among the forms of ADR "encouraged" in
Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act is significant because arbitration raises
unique legal issues. Unlike other forms of ADR, arbitration agreements
generally make the process mandatory and the result final and binding. The civil
rights laws, on the other hand, are premised on de novo federal court enforcement and contain no requirement that an internal dispute resolution system be
utilized or given deference. This tension has been played out, although not
definitively resolved, in two divergent lines of Supreme Court decisions and in
the passage of Section 118.
A. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
In 1974, the Supreme Court held in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.4"
that an employee who had unsuccessfully arbitrated his grievance under a
collective bargaining agreement was not precluded from bringing a Title VII
action over the same matter. The Court examined the legislative history,
purposes, and procedures of Title VII and found that Congress intended federal49
courts to have "plenary powers to secure compliance with Title VII."
Therefore, the Court held, a prior arbitral decision does not foreclose an
individual's right to sue or divest federal courts of jurisdiction.?0 Congress,
considering the policy against discrimination to be of the "highest priority,"

46. For a discussion of reasons arbitration is unsuitable for discrimination claims, see Wendy
S. Tien, Note, Compidsoi-r Arbitration of ADA Claims: Disabling the Disabled. 77 Minn. L. Rev.
1443 (1993).
47. See Singer, supira note 7. at 101.
48. 415 U.S. 36. 94 S. Ct. 1011 (1974).
49. /i. at 45, 94 S. Ct. at 1018. The Court noted that Congress did not give EEOC direct
powers of enforcement and gave individuals "a significant role in the enforcement process" via the
private right of action. /i. "ITIhe private litigant not only redresses his own injury but also
vindicates the important congressional policy against discriminatory employment practices." hi.
50. /d. at 47, 94 S. Ct. at 1019.
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intended to "accord parallel or overlapping remedies" and to provide for
"consideration of employment discrimination claims in several forums."5 '
Focusing on the special circumstances presented by the collective bargaining
context, the Court pronounced contractual and statutory rights "distinctly
separate. 52 Title VII confers individual rights that "can form no part of the
collective-bargaining process since waiver of these rights would defeat the
paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII.""
The Court voiced mistrust of arbitral procedures as "a comparatively
inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights created by Title VII." 54
The labor arbitrator's role is to interpret and apply the agreement of the parties,
not enforce public laws. Arbitrators lack specialized competence in public law
and the arbitral fact-finding process is not equivalent to the judicial.55 The
Court said, however, that the arbitral decision may be "admitted as evidence and
accorded such weight as the court deems appropriate"5 6 and, in an often-quoted
footnote, added that a court may properly give "great weight" to an arbitral
determination that fully considers an employee's Title VII rights, particularly in
purely factual cases." The Court cautioned, though, that "courts should ever
be mindful that Congress, in enacting Title VII, thought it necessary to provide
a judicial forum for the ultimate resolution of discriminatory employment
58 s
claims.
The Court's broad pronouncements in Gardner-Denverled most courts and
commentators to believe the holding applied to any employer-employee
agreement to arbitrate discrimination claims, not just those in collective
bargaining agreements. Neither an agreement to submit disputes to compulsory
arbitration nor a final arbitral decision could foreclose a de novo federal court
action; arbitration and litigation were considered supplementary rather than
mutually exclusive.59 Critics of Gardner-Denver,however, continued to press

51. hi.
52.
/d.
at 50. 94 S. Ct. at1020.
53. hI.at 51.94 S. Ct. at 1021.
54. Id. at 56,94 S. Ct. at 1024.
55. Id. at 57-58, 94 S. Ct. at 1024.
56. Id. at 60, 94 S. Ct. at 1025.
57. Id. at 60 n.21, 94 S. Ct. at 1025 n.21.
58. Id. The Court applied the same principles in three subsequent decisions involving collective
bargaining agreements. See Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 107 S.Ct. 1410
(1987) (Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988)); McDonald v. City of W.
Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 104 S.Ct. 1799 (1984) (Civil Rights Act of 1871,42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988));
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 101 S.Ct. 1437 (1981) (Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
59. See, e.g., Ralph H. Baxter, Jr. & Evelyn M. Hunt, Alternative Dispute Resohution:
Arbitration oJ'Employnent Claims, 15 Employee Rel.L.J.
187, 195 (1989); Barbara L. Schlei & Paul
Grossman. Employment Discrimination Law 1084 (2d ed. 1983); EEOC Policy Guidance: The
Processing of Charges Where There is a Collective largaining Agreement or an Individual
Employment Contract Requiring the Arbitration of Age-Discrimnination.Related Issues, 3 EEOC

Compl. Man. (BNA) N: 1321 (Aug. 29. 1990). The Gardner-Denver Court said that "Title VII was
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the argument that it was unfair to give the employee "two strings to his bow
when the employer has only one" (in the words of the district court)t6 and that
incentives to use the more efficient and expeditious process of arbitration would
be greatly diminished, if not eliminated entirely, by the lack of binding effect on
the employee. 1
B. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
In the years after Gardner-Denver, parties became more interested in
arbitrating their discrimination claims in order to avoid the expense and delay of
ever-more crowded court dockets. 62 Beginning in the late 1980s, a number of
courts held that individual agreements to arbitrate discrimination claims could be
enforced. 63 These courts recognized that procedural protections in arbitration
But other courts continued to use
had improved since Gardner-Denver."'
Gardner-Denver to find discrimination claims per se not subject to compulsory
arbitration. 6' This split in the circuits was resolved, albeit to a somewhat
limited extent, by the Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.'E Without overruling Gardner-Denver, the Court
distinguished its 1974 decision as limited to the context of collective bargaining.
When Mr. Gilmer, a securities representative, was terminated at age sixtytwo, he brought suit alleging a violation of the ADEA. His employer, Interstate,
moved to compel arbitration because Mr. Gilmer had signed a registration

designed to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment
discrimination." 415 U.S. at 48-49, 94 S. Ct. at 1020.
60. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 346 F. Supp. 1012, 1019 (D. Colo. 1971). To this, the
Supreme Court replied that an employer does not have "two strings to his bow" "'for the simple
reason that Title VII does not provide employers with a cause of action against employees," whereas
the employee is "asserting astatutory right independent of the arbitration process." Gardner-Denver,
415 U.S. at 54, 94 S. Ct. at 1022-23.
61.
Schlei & Grossman, supra note 59, at 1085.
62. See Plass, supra note 7. at 788; Note, Agreemnents to Arbitrate Clains Under the Age
Discrimination in Ennplo'mient Act, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 568. 568 (1990).
63. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1990); Pierce v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1882 (N.D. III. 1990); Garfield v.
Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc.. 731 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. III. 1988).
64. After Gardner-Denver, the American Arbitration Association revised its riles to enhance
procedural protections. Plass, stupra note 7, at 788 (quoting Robert Coulson, Fair Treatment:
Voluntary Arbitration of Enqloyee Clains, 33 Arb. J. No. 3, 23 (1978)).
65. See, e.g., Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1990); Utley v.
Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184 (Ist Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1045, 110 S. Ct. 842
(1990); Nicholson v. CPC Int'l. Inc., 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989); Swenson v. Management
Recniters Int'l. Inc., 858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1988). cert. denied, 493 U.S. 848, 110 S. Ct. 143
(1989). Cooper v. Asplhndh free Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1988); Johnson v. University
of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. 783 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1986); Jones v. Baskin, Flaherty, Elliot & Mannino,
P.C., 670 F. Supp. 597 (W.D. Pa. 1987); Steck v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 661 F. Supp.
543 (D.N.J. 1987).
66. IIIS.Ci. 1647 (1991.
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application with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) containing an agreement
to arbitrate with his employer any dispute that might arise concerning his
employment. 67 The district court denied the motion based on Gardner-Denver,
concluding that "Congress intended to protect ADEA claimants from the waiver
of a judicial forum,"68 but the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that the ADEA
did not preclude enforcement of arbitration agreements. The Supreme Court
affirmed in a 7-2 decision, holding Mr. Gilmer had to arbitrate his ADEA claim.
69
The centerpiece of the Court's opinion is the Federal Arbitration Act,
which was enacted in 1925 but not addressed in Gardner-Denver. The FAA
declares arbitration agreements generally "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." 7° The Act's "purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial
hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and
had been adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon
the same footing as other contracts."'"
Starting in the mid-1980s, the Court had begun to interpret the 1925 Act "as
a broad mandate to enforce agreements to arbitrate not only contractual but also
statutory claims" involving rights of importance not only to the litigants but also
to the public at large." 2 After issuing several decisions upholding compulsory
arbitration of statutory claims in the commercial context,73 the Court in Giler
for the first time extended the FAA mandate to statutory civil rights claims. The
Gihner Court distinguished the Gardner-Denver line of cases as involving not
the enforceability of an arbitration agreement but "the quite different issue
whether arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subsequent judicial
resolution of statutory claims."74 Those cases were based on the tension

67. Mr. Gilmer had been required for his employment to register as a securities representative
with the NYSE. The NYSE application stated that he agreed to arbitrate with his employer "any
dispute, claim or controversy" required to be arbitrated tinder NYSE rules. One such rule provided
for arbitration of disputes arising out of his employment or termination of employment. Id. at 165051.
68. Id. at 1651 (quoting district court opinion).
69. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988 & Stpp. IV 1992).
70. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). The Act provides for court orders compelling arbitration and stays
of court proceedings pending arbitration. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1988).
71. Gilner, I IIS.Ct. at 1651 (citations omitted).
72. Note, supra note 62, at 568. 570.
73.
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 109 S. Ct. 1917
(1989) (Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220. 107 S.Ct. 2332 (1987) (alleging violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988 & Stipp. IV 1992), and the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992));
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 105 S.Ct. 3346 (1985)
(antitrust claim Linder the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
74.

Gilner, I II S. Ct. at 1657.
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between collective representation by a union and individual statutory rights, and
were not decided under the FAA.' 5
In Gihner, the Court underscored the FAA's "liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements." 76 This policy "guarantee[s] the enforcement of private
contractual arrangements" 77 and applies equally when statutory rights are at
issue, since, the Court reasoned, "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a
party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits
to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than ajudicial, forum."" 8
The Court said, "[hlaving made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be
held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of
judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue, ' 79 either in the statute's text
or legislative history or in an "inherent conflict" between arbitration and the
statute's underlying purposes.8s The Court saw no conflict between arbitration,
which focuses solely on individual grievances, and the important social policies
of the ADEA: "so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his
or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue
to serve both its remedial and deterrent function."" Nor would arbitration
impair EEOC's enforcement role, the Court said. EEOC has independent
authority to investigate age discrimination, and an individual subject to an
arbitration agreement is still free to file a charge, although not a lawsuit.82 To
Mr. Gilmer's argument that compulsory arbitration improperly deprives claimants
of the judicial forum provided for by the ADEA, the Court pointed out that
Congress did not "explicitly preclude arbitration or other nonjudicial resolution
of claims, even in its recent amendments to the ADEA." s
The Court also rejected Mr. Gilmer's attack on the adequacy of arbitral
procedures as "far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal
statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes."'" The more limited

75. /d.
76. Id. at 1651 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.. 460 U.S.
1, 24, 103 S. Ct. 927, 941 (1983)).
77. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625, 105 S. Ct. at 3353.
78. Gilner, I I I S.Ct. at 1652 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628, 105 S. Ct. at 3354).
79. Id. at 1652 (quoting Mitsubishi. 473 U.S. at 628, 105 S. Ct. at 3354-55). The burden of
showing such congressional intent is on the party seeking to avoid the arbitration agreement. Id.
80. IL (quoting Shearson/Amcrican Express. Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227. 107 S. Ct.
2332, 2337 (1987)).
81. I. at 1653 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637, 105 S. Ci. at 3359).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1653-54. The Court was referring to the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of
1990, Pub. L. 101-433. 104 Stat. 978 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 note, 623, 626, 630 (Supp. IV
1992)), which sets forth the terms under which individuals may waive their ADEA rights. The Court
noted that the ADEA provides a "lexible approach to resolution of claims" through out-of-court
methods such as conciliation by EEOC and through concurrent state court jurisdiction. Gilmer, 111
S. Ct. at 1654. The Court also noted that Congress did not intend that EEOC be involved in all
employment disputes, which can be settled without EEOC involvement. Id. at 1653.
84. Id. at 1654 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v.ShearsonlAmLerican Express. Inc.. 490 U.S. 477,
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discovery available under the NYSE rules would not deprive claimants of "a fair
opportunity" to prove discrimination, the Court said, particularly since arbitrators
are not bound by the rules of evidence. 8 Although arbitral discovery procedures "might not be as extensive as in the federal courts, by agreeing to arbitrate,
a party 'trades the procedures and opportunity for review 8of
the courtroom for
6
the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.'
Mr. Gilmer had maintained that since arbitrators often will not issue written
decisions, arbitration will result "in a lack of public knowledge of employers'
discriminatory policies, an inability to obtain effective appellate review, and a
stifling of the development of the law."8" But the Court noted that the NYSE
rules required written arbitration awards, available to the public, and that judicial
development of ADEA law would continue because "it is unlikely that all 'or
even most ADEA claimants will be subject to arbitration agreements. "88
Furthermore, arbitrators under the NYSE rules have the power to award equitable
relief and conduct collective actions.8 9 Mr. Gilmer's contention that the
unequal bargaining power between employers and employees should render
arbitration agreements unenforceable also was unavailing, since there was no
indication Mr. Gilmer had been coerced or defrauded into agreeing to the
arbitration clause.'
C. Unresolved Issues
Gilner left many questions unanswered. The majority had declined to
address the scope of the FAA's Section I exemption for "contracts of employment."" The dissent argued that Section I exempted Mr. Gilmer's NYSE

481, 109 S. Ct. 1917, 1920 (1989)).
85. Id. at 1655.
86. /i. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614. 628,
105 S. Ct. 3346, 3354 (1985)).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1655-56. Although "Imlere inequality in bargaining power ... is not a suflicient
reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context," the
Court said, "courts should remain attnned to well-supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate
resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds 'for
the revocation of any contract.' hd.(quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627, 105 S. Ci. at 3354).
91. Id. at 1651 n.2. Section I of the FAA provides: "'[Nlothing herein contained shall apply
to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1(1988). The majority declined to address this issue
because Mr. Gilmer had not raised section I in the lower courts and, in any case, the arbitration
clause was contained not in a contract of employment but rather in Mr. Gilmer's securities
registration application, acontract with the sectrities exchange. Lower courts following Gihner have
tnanimotsly held that an arbitration agreement contained in a securities registration application is
not a contract of employment and thus is not excluded by section I. See, e.g., Willis v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229,
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registration application from mandatory arbitration because the section covers
"any agreements by the employee to arbitrate disputes with the employer arising
out of the employment relationship, particularly where such agreements to
arbitrate are conditions of employment."92 The lower courts are divided on the
meaning of Section I's ambiguous language. Some have interpreted it narrowly
to exclude only employees actually engaged in the physical movement of goods
in interstate commerce, i.e., in the transportation industries,93 but others have
read it as broadly as the dissent in Gilmer did. 94 No doubt the Supreme Court
or Congress will revisit this issue since no sound rationale is apparent for varying
the rules on arbitration of civil rights claims depending on the industry in which
the plaintiff works.
Does Gihner apply to civil rights statutes other than the ADEA? Lower
courts consistently have extended Gilmer to claims under Title VII and other
employment statutes, although most such cases so far have involved securities
industry registration agreements as in Gilner.9"5 Because the ADEA and Title

230 n.] (5th Cir. 1991); Lockhart v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., Civ. A. No. 93-2418-GTV, 1994
WL 34870 (D. Kan. Jan. 25, 1994); Scott v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 89 Civ.
3749 (MJL), 1992 WL 245506 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1992).
92. Gibher, I II S. Ct. at 1659 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. See, e.g., Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9,739 F.2d 1159 (7th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160, 105 S.Ct. 912 (1985); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball
Club, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972); Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783 (Ist Cir. 1971); Tenney
Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953) (en bane).
For post-Gihner cases involving employment, see Scott v. Farm Family Life Ins. Co., 827 F. Supp.
76 (D. Mass. 1993) (Section I does not exempt a Title VII plaintifls contract as an insurance sales
agent with defendant, since the plaintiff was not engaged in the transportation industry): Hull v. NCR
Corp., 826 F. Supp. 303, 306 (E.D. Mo. 1993) (plaintif's employment contract held not within the
scope of the Section I exemption because the plaintifT was not a seaman, railroad worker, or
employee actually engaged in the movement of interstate commerce); Williams v. Katten, Muchen
& Zavis, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 792 (N.D. III. 1993) (law firm partnership agreement,
although an employment contract, is not excluded by Section I because the plaintiff was not in the
transportation industry).
94. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 889 F.2d 940 (10th
Cir. 1989); Herring v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.. 894 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir.), ccrt. denied, 494 U.S. 1016,
110 S.Ct. 1319 (1990); United Elec.. Radio, & Mach. Workers v. Miller Metal Prods., Inc., 215 F.2d
221 (4th Cir. 1954).
In Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991), the EEOC argued as amicus
curiae for this broad interpretation of the Section I exemption. The Sixth Circuit agreed in dicta but
held the contract at issue was a securities registration agreement like in Gilner not an employment
contract. Id. at 311-12.
95. See, e.g., Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (1Ith Cir. 1992) (Title VII
claim; arbitration agreement contained in a securities registration application); Alford v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229. 230 n.I(5th Cir. 1991) (same); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991) (same), Mago v.Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.
1992) (Title VII claim; arbitration agreement contained in an employment application); Saari v. Smith
Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 968 F.2d 877 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 494 (1992) (claim
under Employee Polygraph Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-09 (1988), subject to mandatory
arbitration pursuant to a securities registration application); Williams v. Katten, Muchen & Zavis, 63
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VII are similar statutes, both enforced by the EEOC, these courts have found in
Title VII no evidence of congressional intent to preclude arbitration.9
What standards must be met to ensure the fairness and adequacy of the
arbitral process? Gihner makes clear that an agreement to arbitrate must be
entered into knowingly and voluntarily, without fraud or coercion, as judged on
a case-by-case basis. The Court, however, did not set forth standards for
determining whether an agreement to arbitrate is entered into knowingly and
voluntarily. 97 It did not discuss whether an arbitration agreement that is a
mandatory condition of employment can be considered voluntary, or what
consideration for an agreement is adequate.98 The Court did refer to the Older
Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, which establishes standards for
determining whether a waiver of ADEA rights is knowing and voluntary. 99
Because the OWBPA went into effect after Mr. Gilmer's claim, the Court did
not address its impact on arbitration agreements. Thus, it is an open question
whether the OWBPA standards, which were enacted due to concerns over

Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 792 (N.D. III. 1993) (claims tinder Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992) arbitrable pursuant to a law firm partnership agreement); Hull v. NCR
Corp., 826 F. Stpp. 303, 306 (E.D. Mo. 1993) (Title VII and ADEA claims: arbitration agreement
in employment contract); Scott v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 89 Civ. 3749
(MJL), 1992 WL 245506 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1992) (claims tinder Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981
subject to arbitration under a securities registration application); Lockhart v. A.G. Edwards & Sons,
Inc., Civ. A. No. 93-2418-GTV. 1994 WL 34870 (D. Kan. Jan. 25, 1994) (Title VII and state law
claims; securities registration agreement).
A number of commentators, however, have argued against applying Gilmer to other statutes. See
Tien, supra note 46 (arguing compulsory arbitration of ADA claims is inconsistent with the ADA's
policies); Mark D. Klimek, Note, Discrinimition Chtinis Under Title VII: Where Mandatory
Arbitration Goes Too For, 8 Ohio St. J.on Disp. Resol. 425 (1993) (Title VII claims should not be
precluded by arbitration); Jenifer A. Magyar, Note. Staninnr Civil Rights Claims in Arbitration:
Analysis of Gilner v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.. 72 B.U. L. Rev. 641, 655 (1992) (civil rights
cases should not be subject to compulsory arbitration).
96. Some courts also have relied on Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See infra text
accompanying notes 113-118.
97. Some commentators maintain that the Court's language suggests it intended that acommonlaw standard should apply. See King et al., supra note 44. at 119-20. Accordingly, they argue,
arbitration agreements should be binding except in cases of fraud or unlawful coercion. Id. at 120.
98. Compare Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992) (remanding
Title VII claim for determination if arbitration contract should be voided as a contract of adhesion)
with Lockhart v. A.G. Edwards & Sons. Inc.. Civ. A. No. 93-2418-GTV, 1994 WL 34870 (D. Kan.
Jan. 25, 1994) (securities registration agreement containing an arbitration clause is neither
unconscionable nor a contract of adhesion, even though the plaintiff argued she had no choice but
to sign the agreement in order to be registered with the NYSE). See Spelfogel, supra note 17, at
262-63 (maintaining that as to newly hired employees, requiring mandatory arbitration as a condition
of employment would clearly be supported by consideration; as to current employees, consideration
for a newly instituted arbitration requirement may be a promotion, raise, or benefit increase, or the
benefits to the employee of arbitral procedures combined with the employer's waiver of the right to
a jury trial).
99. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., III S.C1. 1647, 1653 n.3 (1991). See 29 U.S.C.
§ 626 (Stipp. IV 1992) (OWBPA standards). See also supra note 83.
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waivers of substantive ADEA rights, apply to waivers of procedural ADEA
rights, in particular the right to a judicial forum.'t°
The extent of discovery that must be provided to give claimants "afair
opportunity to present their claims"'' was not specified in Gilmer. The Court
approved of the NYSE procedures, which provided for protections against biased
arbitrators, discovery (including document production, information requests,
depositions, and subpoenas), and written opinions available to the public. 02
Plaintiffs traditionally have considered broad discovery critical to proving a
discrimination claim. By examining the employer's treatment of similarly
situated employees, discovery may enable the plaintiff to show pretext or
uncover a broader pattern of discrimination. But the more extensive the
discovery, the more arbitration becomes indistinguishable from litigation.
Gilneralso left important relief questions unanswered. The Court rejected
Mr. Gilmer's argument that arbitration procedures cannot adequately further the
ADEA's purposes because they do not provide for broad equitable relief and
class actions. Arbitrators "do have the power to fashion equitable relief," the
Court said, noting that the NYSE rules "do not restrict the types of relief an
arbitrator may award."'0 3 As the Fourth Circuit had found, the arbitrator had
authority to award essentially the same individual relief obtainable through court
enforcement under the ADEA, including equitable relief such as reinstatement
or promotion."
The Gilner decision thus appears premised on the availability in the arbitral
process of the same substantive rights and remedies-at least on an individual
basis-that are available in court."-' The Court intimated, however, that the
inability to provide class relief would not necessarily invalidate the arbitral

100. With respect to the OWBPA standards. an argument can be made based on the legislative
history that they encompass the "totality of the circumstances" test employed by some courts for
evaluating waivers pre-OWBPA. S. Rep. No. 263. 101 st Cong.. 2d Sess. 31-34 (1990). eprtintedin
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509. 1537-40. Under this test. the courts look at the complete circumstances
surrounding the execution of a waiver, such as the plaintiff's education and business experience, the
knew or should have known
amount of time for deliberation before signing, and whether the plaintiff
of his or her rights, had the opportunity to negotiate the terms of the waiver, and had benefit of
counsel. Cirillo v. Areo Chetn. Co.. 862 F.2d 448. 451 (3d Cir, 1988). Some commentators have
asserted that ifcourts applied the "totality of the circumstances" test to ADEA waivers of the right
to a judicial forum, the courts would invalidate a greater number of arbitration agreements, and
employers would be less willing to use such agreements due to the unpredictability of their
application. King et al., stpr note 44, at 119. Moreover, they argue. Gilmer favored the commonlaw test rather than the "'totality of the circumstances" test, regardless of the statute at issue. See
supra note 97.
101.
Giher, Ill S. Ct. at 1655.
102. Id. at 1654-55.
103. Id.
104. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.. 895 F.2d 195. 199 (4th Cir. 1990).
105. Gilmer, I II S. Ct. at 1652 ("By agreeing to arbitrate 1istatutory claim, a party does not
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statte.") (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.. 473 U.S. 614, 628, 105 S. Ct. 3346. 3354 (1985)).
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process."° The Civil Rights Act of 1991 added compensatory and punitive
damages to the remedies available in Title VII and ADA cases. (It did not
amend the ADEA with respect to relief.) Most commentators and employer
representatives have agreed that, to enhance the likelihood an arbitral award will
be given preclusive effect, arbitrators should have authority to
award full
°7
individual relief, including compensatory and punitive damages.'
What is the extent of judicial review available for arbitral decisions? Gilner
technically involved only the issue of whether an arbitration agreement could be
enforced to require a party to go through the arbitral process; the Court did not
directly hold the ensuing arbitral decision to be final and preclusive." 8 But
many statements in the Court's opinion indicate the Court assumed it was
final."° If so, the grounds for judicial review of arbitral awards are limited."10

106. Id. at 1655 (Even if class relief could not be granted by the arbitrator, "the fact that the
[ADEA] provides for the possibility of bringing a collective action does not mean that individual
attempts at conciliation were intended to be barred.") (quoting Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d
221, 241 (3d Cir. 1989) (Becker, J.,
dissenting)).
107. See Bompey & Pappas, iqpra note 44, at 209; Piskorski & Ross, stura note 44, at 216;
King et al., suqpra note 44, at 124; Spelfogel, supra note 17, at 264.
108. See Piskorski & Ross, suqra note 44, at 216 & n.25. In Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1992). the court, after having earlier found the plaintiffs Title VII
claims subject to mandatory arbitration pursuant to asecurities registration application (see supra note
91), upheld the district court's dismissal of the claims with prejudice. The court reasoned that since
all of the issues in the case must be submitted to arbitration, it would serve no purpose to retain
jurisdiction when any post-arbitration relief sought by the parties would not entail adjudication of the
merits of the controversy. Id. at 1164. See also Note, supra note 62, at 579 (Although the issues
of enforceability and preclusion are formally distinct, "they are fundamentally the same; to enforce
an agreement to arbitrate ex ante but deny it preclusive effect ex post would 'rnn counter to the
historical preference for finality manifested in the FAA.') (quoting Speidel, supra note 30, at 20304).
109. See. e.g., I IIS. Ct. at 1652 ("[bly agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, aparty does not
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral.
rather than a judicial, forum") (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628, 105 S.Ct. at 2354).
110. Section 10 of the FAA provides that a district court may vacate an arbitrator's award on
grounds of corntption, fraud, partiality, or misconduct, or if the arbitrator exceeded his powers. 9
U.S.C. § 10 (Supp. IV 1992). Errors of fact or law are not grounds for reversal. The Gilmer Court
noted that although judicial review of arbitration awards is limited, "'such review is sufficient to
ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute' at issue." Gihner, 111 S.CI. at
1655 n.4 (quoting Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232, 107 S. Ct.
2332, 2340 (1987)). Similarly, labor arbitration awards are subject to very limited judicial review.
United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 108 S.Ct. 364 (1987). However, a
court may refuse to enforce an arbitrator's award under acollective bargaining agreement if the award
is contrary to well-defined, dominant public policy. Id. at 42-43, 108 S.Ct. at 373-74. Accordingly,
courts have vacated arbitration awards that order the reinstatement of individuals discharged for
sexual harassment, since there is an explicit public policy against sexual harassment. See, e.g.,
Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir.
1992); Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union, No. 915, 915 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1990).
But see Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Int'l Union. Allied Indus. Workers of America, 959 F.2d 685 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 304 (1992); Communication Workers of America v. Southeastern Elec.
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Finally, the Court made clear that an individual subject to an arbitration
agreement is still free to file an EEOC charge, and that arbitration agreements
"will not preclude the EEOC from 14ringing actions seeking class-wide and
equitable relief.'.. Thus, EEOC has authority to investigate and conciliate the
charge and file suit if conciliation fails. Gilner was, however, silent on the
scope of relief EEOC may seek. Based on the well-established principle that
EEOC enforcement actions vindicate the broader public interest in eradicating
employment discrimination, the EEOC has long maintained that preclusion
doctrines generally do not bar Commission litigation for injunctive relief or other
relief necessary to vindicate the public interest.2
D. Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
The Civil Rights Act of 1991," ' although enacted shortly after Gilmer, did
not resolve any of these questions. The legislation lists "arbitration" among the
forms of ADR "encouraged" in Section 118, all qualified by the proviso, "where
appropriate and to the extent authorized by law."" 4 As with other difficult
issues in this bill on which consensus could not be reached, Congress has handed
the issue to the courts. Not surprisingly, the inconclusive legislative history
offers something to both sides." 5 A number of lower courts have relied on the
language of Section 118, which "expressly approves and encourages arbitration
as a method of enforcing rights under Title VII,""' 6 as further evidence of
congressional intent not to preclude arbitration of Title VI1 claims." 7 Thus,

Cooperative, 882 F.2d 467 (10th Cir. 1989).
Even if an arbitral award is not deemed preclusive. it would certainly be entitled to "appropriate
weight" tinder Gard,,er-Dener. See supra at 1541 and infra at 1552 & note 133.
111. Gihner, 11I S. Ct. at 1655.
112. In apost-Gitiner case, the EEOC has filed an ADEA suit on behalf of aclass of employees,
some of whom had signed securities industry arbitration agreements and proceeded through
arbitration. EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.. No. 92 Civ. 9243 (S.D.N.Y., filed Dec. 23, 1992).
113. Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (Supp. IV 1992).
115. Compare H.R. Rep. No. 40. 102d Cong., IstSess. 97 (1991), reprinted il 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,635 (ADR is intended to supplement, not supplant, the remedies provided by Title
VII; thus, arbitration would have no preclusive effect "whether in the context of a collective
bargaining agreement or in an employment contract.") with 137 Cong. Rec. S15478 (daily ed. Oct.
30, 1991) ("In light of the litigation crisis facing this country and the increasing sophistication and
reliability of alternatives to litigation, there is no reason to disfavor the use of such forums.") (citing
Gilmer) (statement of Sen. Dole and Rep. Hyde).
116. Williams v. Katten, Muchen & Zavis, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 792. 797 (N.D. Ill.
1993).
117.
Williams, 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas (BNA) at 797; Scott v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., No. 89 Civ. 3749 (MJL), 1992 WL 245506 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 1992); Lockhart v.
A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., Civ. A. No. 93-2418-GTV, 1994 WL 34870 (D. Kan. Jan. 25, 1994)
(rejecting plaintiffs reliance on the legislative history since the plain language of the statute
specifically endorses arbitration); Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 619 N.E.2d 998 (N.Y.),
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neither the Civil Rights Act of 1991 nor Gilner resolved the serious questions
with respect to the use of arbitration in employment discrimination disputes. But
the more the lower courts expand the Gilmer decision, the more likely Congress
will revisit the arbitration question.' ~
E. Arbitration Alternatives
The ongoing debate over the appropriateness of arbitration reflects important
competing concerns. The clear trend in the Supreme Court has been to stress the
benefits of arbitration and the value of giving disputants freedom to choose the
forum they believe best suited for their claims. In tension with this are concepts
long deemed fundamental by many in the civil rights arena, that the resolution
of discrimination claims is a matter of public importance to be reserved for a
public forum, and that employees with unequal bargaining power should be
protected from overreaching employers, who are perceived as having the upper
hand in arbitration. Questions have been raised whether it is possible for an
individual to waive a procedural right "knowingly" before any substantive
dispute has occurred, or to agree to arbitration "voluntarily" as a condition of

employment or promotion.
Until Congress or the Court speaks again, employers seeking to avoid legal
challenge while still realizing many of arbitration's benefits might consider
voluntary or non-binding forms of arbitration. For example, an agreement to
arbitrate a particular dispute, entered into after the dispute has arisen, would be
more likely to be enforced than an agreement required as a condition of employment.' 9 Alternatively, agreements to arbitrate as a condition of employment

cert.denied, 114 S. Ct. 554 (1993). Nonetheless, in a case pending on appeal to the Ninth Circuit,
plaintiffs contend that Section 118 and its legislative history establish congressional intent to overturn
the Gilner holding. Lai v. Prudential Ins., Inc., No. 92-55902 (C.D. Cal. filed June, 1992) (discussed
in McDowell, supra note 4, at 89-90).
118. Indeed, opposition to the Gilner decision and binding arbitration in general already has
arisen in Congress. In March, 1994, Sen. Feingold introduced legislation entitled the "Protection
from Coercive Employment Agreements Act," S. 2012, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1994), that would
make it an unlawful employment practice Linder Title VII to: "(I) fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual ...because the
individual refuses to submit any claim Lnder this title to mandatory arbitration; or (2) make the
submission of such claim to mandatory arbitration acondition of the hiring, continued employment,
or compensation, or aterm, condition, or privilege of employment, of the individual." The bill would
similarly amend the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the Americans with lDisabilities
Act of 1990, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and 42 U.S.C. 1981.
119. The legislative history of Section 118 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act includes astatement by
Rep. Edwards that, while expressing disapproval of Gilmer, endorses post-dispute arbitration. 137
Cong. Rec. H9530 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) ("This section contemplates the use of voluntary
arbitration to resolve specific disputes after they have arisen, not coercive attempts to force employees
in advance to forego statutory rights."). The legislative history is unclear, however, as to whether
such "volhntary arbitration" agreements could preclude the right to go to court. See also Tien, supra
note 46, at 1472-73 (advocating post-dispute agreements, either to submit a claim to final
and binding
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can make the process optional as to discrimination claims. Or, if submission of
a claim to arbitration is mandatory (as in Gihner),120 the result can be made
non-binding on the employee as to discrimination claims, so that the employee
retains the right to go to court (as in Gardner-Denver).' 2 '
These variations, although a departure from traditional arbitration as favored
by employers, still offer many of its advantages.12 2 As with other forms of
ADR, voluntary or non-binding arbitration may still achieve finality as a practical
if not legal matter. It will resolve a certain percentage of complaints to the
parties' mutual satisfaction, and even when it does not preclude resort to the
courts, a well-founded arbitral decision will be given "great weight" under
23
Gardner-Denver.
V. ADR AND THE EEOC'S PROCESSES
Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act encourages a wide range of types of
ADR in addition to arbitration, such as settlement negotiations, conciliation,
facilitation, mediation, factfinding, and minitrials. In exploring all of these
options, companies should keep in mind the legal limits affecting ADR
processes. While employers might prefer that ADR processes be exclusive and
final, federal employment discrimination statutes protect individuals' access to
the EEOC.'24 Despite these restraints, ADR techniques can bring considerable
benefits to employers and employees.
.The EEOC in EEOC v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and
Universities of Illinois' 25. challenged the legality of a collective bargaining
agreement provision that denied employees their right to a grievance proceeding
whenever the employee filed a charge or lawsuit. The EEOC contended that the
provision violated Section 4(d) of the ADEA, which forbids discrimination
against employees who have filed a charge, complaint, or lawsuit. The Seventh
Circuit first noted that in determining whether a retaliatory policy violates the

arbitration, with a waiver of judicial resolution no matter what the outcome: or to submit to nonbinding arbitration producing an award to which the employee has the option to consent, thus settling
the claim and waiving the right to go to court); Coulson, supra note 64, at 26-27 (model agreement
for submission of an existing dispute to arbitration under the rules of the American Arbitration
Association).
120. III S.Ct. 1647(1991).
121. 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011 (1974).
122. See Tien, supra note 46, at 1474-75.
123. See supra text accompanying note 57.
124. See the antiretaliation provisions in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1988); ADEA, 29
U.S.C. § 623(d) (1988); ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (Supp. IV 1992). See also'Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., III S. Ct. 1647, 1653 (1991) ("An individual ADEA claimant subject to
an arbitration agreement will still be free to file a charge with the EEOC .... "); OWBPA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 629(f)(4) (Supp. IV 1992) ("No waiver may be used to justify interfering with the protected right
of an employee to file a charge or participate in an investigation or proceeding conducted by the
Commission.").
125. 957 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1992). cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 299 (1993).
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ADEA, it is "immaterial that an employee might have overlapping contractual
and legal remedies" and "irrelevant" that the employer was acting in good
faith. 26 It concluded that a retaliatory policy constitutes a per se violation of
Section 4(d).127 The court next looked at whether this particular collective
bargaining agreement was retaliatory. The court found that it was, stating that
a "collective bargaining agreement may not provide that grievances will proceed
to arbitration only if the employee refrains from participating in protected activity
under the ADEA.' ' 8
In a subsequent case, EEOC v. General Motors Corp.,29 the company
deferred the access of nonunion, salaried employees to an internal complaint
resolution procedure once the employees tiled discrimination charges with the
EEOC. The company argued that, unlike Board of Governors, its denial of the
proceeding was not stripping an employee of a benefit because it retained control
over whether and to what extent the complaint should be remedied, regardless
of whether or not the employee complained to the EEOC. 30 The court
disagreed, finding that the "open door" policy was a privilege, and that under
Board of Governors, stripping an employee of that privilege was a per se
violation of Title VII and the ADEA.' 3'
These cases pose a problem for companies who argue that there is less
incentive for them to institute their own ADR procedures when the employee can
proceed simultaneously with the EEOC. 32 But even if the use of ADR does
not preclude filing with the EEOC, the use of an internal procedure can, as a
practical matter, enhance the company's position
before the Commission and the
4
courts,' 33 as well as with its employees.'
Language in the Supreme Court's landmark sexual harassment case of
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson-' supports the view that companies with
effective internal grievance procedures will have a stronger position in court.
The Court noted that the facts involving the company's grievance procedure and
policy against discrimination, although "not necessarily dispositive," were
"plainly relevant" in determining the employer's liability for sexual harass36
ment. 1

126. Id. at 428.
127. Id. at 429.
128. Id. at 431.
129. 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1657. 1658 (N.D. III. 1993).
130. Id. at 1659-60.
131. Id. at 1660.
132. See McDowell, supra note 4, at 85. See also stqnra note 125.
133. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21, 94 S. Ct. 101l, 1025 n.21 (1974)
("Where an arbitral determination gives full consideration to an employee's Title VII rights, a court
may properly accord it great weight."). See also Westin & Feliu. suqpra note 36, at 267-68.
134. See Westin & Feliu, swpra note 36, at 224.
135. 477 U.S. 71, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
136. Id. at 72. 106 S. Ct. at 2406. In a concurring opinion, Justice Marshall noted that an
effective internal complaint procedure would not affect the employer's liability, but could affect the
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At the administrative level as well, the employer's internal complaint
resolution procedure is relevant. Thus, for example, following Meritor, the
EEOC issued a "Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment,"
stating that an employer should have a procedure for resolving sexual harassment
complaints, and in fact "can divest its supervisors of [their] apparent authority
[to engage in sexual harassment] by implementing a strong policy against sexual
harassment and maintaining an effective complaint procedure."' 37 Moreover,
[w]hen an employer asserts it has taken remedial action; the Commission will investigate to determine whether the action was appropriate
and, more important, effective ....
If the Commission finds that the
harassment has been eliminated, all victims made whole, and preventative measures instituted, the Commission normally will administratively
close the charge because of the employer's prompt remedial action.' 38
Thus, even if ADR is not legally binding or compulsory, if the process is
attractive to employees and effective, the decision reached in the internal
procedures could be final as a practical matter. A procedure that adequately
remedies the violation will result in a high degree of user satisfaction, and
satisfied employees are less likely to pursue their claims in court or at the EEOC.
If employees do go to court or the EEOC, the employer's use of a fair and
effective dispute resolution procedure should weigh in its favor.
V1. EEOC's USE OF- ADR
As a result of the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and the Americans
with Disabilities Act, the EEOC's ever-burgeoning caseload has increased
significantly, 39 and the Commission is searching for ways to perform its role
more effectively.
For the EEOC, certainly, the use of ADR is not new. Indeed, in order to
pass Title VII, Congress struck a compromise that the Commission would not
have enforcement authority over private sector suits. 40 Since many in
Congress considered employment disputes as private, individual interest disputes

relief to which the employee was entitled, including injunctive relief. Id. at 77-78, 106 S. Ct. at
2410-2411. See also Westin & Feli, supra note 36, at 268-69.
137. 3 EEOC Compl. Man. IBNA) N:4031. N:4056 (Mar. 19. 1990).
138. Id. at N:4061.
139. The number of charges filed with the EEOC has increased from 59,411 in fiscal year 1989
to 87,942 in fiscal year 1993, the largest number filed during any fiscal year in the agency's history.
Office of Program Operations, EEOC, Fourth Quarter Report for Fiscal Year 1993, at 1, 6
(unpublished document) thereinafter *'Program Operations Report"). Yet the EEOC has 100 fewer
investigators than it had in 1989. /d. at 5.
140. Private parties could bring suit under Title VII, and the EEOC could enter only as amicus
curiae. The Attorney General was authorized to file pattern-or-practice suits against private
employers.
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ideally suited to conciliation, the Commission's role was limited to investigating
charges andattempting to conciliate them.' 4' Thus, ADR has been an important part of the EEOC's mandate from the beginning. Ultimately, Congress in
1972 amended Title VII to give the Commission the authority to go to court
to
42
enforce Title VII-but even then only when conciliation efforts failed.
Since its inception, the Commission has struggled with its duty to deal with
the large number of discrimination charges brought by individuals, as well as its
role in defining employment discrimination policy. With always limited
resources, the Commission has used alternative approaches to accomplishing its
mission, at times emphasizing settlement and at times emphasizing litigation.
For example, in 1979, the EEOC instituted "rapid charge processing" in all of
its district offices, which consisted of early, negotiated "no-fault" settlements
based on limited or no investigations. During the Reagan Administration, the
EEOC shifted its focus from settlement to litigation in order to better establish
EEOC's role as a law enforcement agency.' 43
In the 1990s, the EEOC is looking again to ADR, while still maintaining the
strong law enforcement program established in the 1980s. In addition to the
Civil Rights Act, Congress has encouraged ADR through other legislation. On
November 15, 1990, it enacted the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act,'
further authorizing and encouraging federal agencies to use alternative means of
resolving disputes.'45 As a result of the ADRA, the Commission is developing
a policy statement on the use of alternative dispute resolution in Commission
processes. A number of other recent actions also encourage ADR. The
Negotiated Rulemaking Act provides for the use of negotiated rulemaking for

141. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 358-59, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 2450-51 (1977).
See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44, 94 S. Ct. 1011, 1017 (1974)
("Cooperation and volhntary compliance were selected as the preferred means for achieving [the
EEOC'sl goal" of assuring equality of employment opportunities.).
142. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 4(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1988).
Once the Commission finds reasonable cause, it "shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged
unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988). If "the Commission is] unable to secure ... a conciliation agreement
acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent not
a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision named in the charge." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f)(1) (1988). The Commission may also issue a notice of right to sue to the charging party
who may then bring a private action. Id.
143. See R. Gaull Silberman, I Admin. L.J. 527, 533-36 (1987); Statement of Enforcement
Policy, 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) GC:1403 (Sept. II. 1984); Policy Statement on Remedies and
Relief for Individual Cases of Unlawful Discrimination, 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) GC: 1406 (Feb.
5, 1985); Investigative Compliance Policy Statement, 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) GC:1413 (July
14, 1986). See also supra note 19.
144. 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-583 (Supp. IV 1992).
145. The legislative history notes that agencies were currently able to use ADR methods, but
"[t]he purpose of S. 971 is to place government-wide emphasis on the use of innovative ADR
procedures by agencies and to put in place astatutory framework to foster the effective and sound
use of these flexible alternatives to litigation." S. Rep. No. 543. 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3931, 3932.
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federal agencies. 46 Executive'Order No. 12,778 instructs federal litigators to
use ADR processes where they "will contribute to the prompt, fair, and efficient
resolution of claims."'' 47 Executive Order No. 12,871 instructs agency heads
'4
to train agency employees "in consensual methods of dispute resolution,"'
and Executive Order No. 12,866 directs agencies "to explore and, where
appropriate, use consensual
mechanisms for developing regulations, including
' 49
negotiated rulemaking."'
The EEOC conducted a pilot mediation program in its Houston, New
Orleans, Philadelphia, and Washington field offices. The Commission's goal was
to resolve charges of discrimination more quickly and less expensively, while
ensuring fairness to all parties. 15
The Center for Dispute Settlement, a
nonprofit organization, administered the pilot program for EEOC.'3' The pilot
ran from April 1, 1993 through March 31, 1994. Eligible charges were those
involving discharge, discipline, and terms and conditions of employment under
Title VII, the ADA and the ADEA.5 2 The program did not include class
claims, harassment claims, and Equal Pay Act claims.
Participation in mediation was voluntary for all of the parties. If both parties
agreed to mediate, the EEOC suspended its investigation for up to sixty days to
allow for mediation. Under the pilot, mediators were not EEOC investigators or
employees, but were outsiders specially trained for this project. As part of the
experiment, in half of the cases the EEOC paid for the mediator; in a quarter of
the cases the mediator was a volunteer; and in a quarter of the cases the
employer paid for the mediator. The mediation was conducted face-to4ace or
by telephone. The parties had the right to stop mediation at any point, and the
charging party could return to the regular complaint process. The parties could
use counsel, but it was not required. All discussions were confidential, and the
EEOC will not have access to this information. If the parties were able to
resolve their dispute, they signed a Settlement Agreement Form, and the charging

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70 (Supp. IV 1992).
3 C.F.R. 359 (1992).
Section 2(c), 58 Fed. Reg. 52,201, 52,202-03 (1993).
Section 6(a)(I), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,740 (1993).
The threshold criteria for the program were as follows:
I. the rights of allparties accorded by the statutes the Commission enforces must be
fully
protected;
2. participation in the ADR process can only involve persons who have filed complaints
with the EEOC or with the state or local agencies with which EEOC has worksharing
agreements;
3. participation in the ADR process is voiuntary lbr both parties tothe matter; and
4. consistency with the standards and requirements of the Dispute Resolution Act of
1990 must be prevalent.
EEOC Intake Staff Pilot Mediation Program Training Manual 3 unfpublished document).
151. Established in 1971. the Center for Dispute Resolution provides mediation, facilitation,
training, and the design of systems for resolving disputes.
152. Approximately 50% of the EEOC's caseload in the 1993 fiscal year was attributable to
discharge claims. Program Operations Report. spra note 139, at 2.
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party agreed to withdraw his or her charge. The agreement is enforceable by the
EEOC.
Of the 920 charging parties offered mediation, 796 or 87% of them accepted
mediation. In comparison, approximately 39% of respondents agreed to try
mediation.
Agreements were reached in 52% of the approximately 267
mediations that have been completed. In 17 cases, parties agreed to mediate, and
then settled prior to mediation. Preliminary evaluations indicate that 92% of both
charging parties and respondents who participated in the program were satisfied,
and 80% said they would try mediation again.
An outside professional evaluator is evaluating the program, examining such
issues as whether charging parties and respondents were satisfied with the
mediation process and outcome, whether the parties would use mediation again,
reasons for differences in settlement rates among the four district offices
participating, and the results of agreements.
Based on the results of this pilot, the EEOC will consider incorporating
ADR methods into the field offices' charge resolution repertoire. As it has
throughout its history, the agency must balance its duty to provide prompt relief
to individual victims of discrimination with its duty to act in the public's interest
in vitiating illegal discrimination.
VII. CONCLUSION
Alternative dispute resolution methods will play an important role in the
post-Civil Rights Act of 1991 era of employment discrimination law. In a time
of expanded rights and remedies, ADR offers benefits to employers and
employees by resolving claims expeditiously and inexpensively, as well as to the
public by relieving crowded court and agency dockets.
For ADR to continue to receive judicial, legislative, and public endorsement,
it must be consistent with the important public policies of our nation's civil
rights laws. ADR furthers the civil rights laws' remedial and compensatory
purposes by resolving particular claims brought by individual complainants.
Unlike judicial resolution, however, ADR does not set precedents, contribute to
the development of clear, consistent legal standards to govern future conduct, or
reach beyond the particular dispute to identify or eradicate class-based
discrimination. The paradox of private versus public dispute resolution was wellstated by Linda Singer in Settling Disputes:
Fears that settlements will pacify legitimate complaints, thus hiding
them from public scrutiny, battle against the recognition that perhaps the
majority of these complaints cannot be resolved at all if they are not
settled promptly. Yet the few test cases provide the impetus to settle
the thousands of others ....
[Complainants] often prefer getting faster,
5
less expensive, and private relief to becoming test cases.' "

153.

Singer. supia note 7. at 161.
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The reality is that a more informal, simpler, and less confrontational system like
ADR will encourage more valid complaints of discrimination to come forward.
For many individuals, ADR expands access to the legal system.
Employers should remember that a high degree of user satisfaction is the
best measure of success of ADR. A good internal system which quickly
responds to employee concerns, effectively identifies and remedies violations,
and preserves employees' statutory rights is the cornerstone of good human
resource policy.

